中國(guó)人民大學(xué)何超教授在中國(guó)人民大學(xué)財(cái)政金融學(xué)院作了題為常委貸款工具和公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)操的講座，講座的主要內(nèi)容是：

　　我們研究了三種不同的貨幣政策執(zhí)行方案的影響：包干稅(LST)，站在借貸工具(SLF)，以及公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)操作(OMO)，在一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的貨幣政策框架，其中代理商積極借入和借出和貿(mào)易的政府債券。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，如果沒(méi)有金融摩擦，預(yù)期的通貨膨脹具有相同的邊際效應(yīng)，無(wú)論三個(gè)實(shí)施方案的這是由中央銀行(CB)。但是，與單純OMO，雖然積極的通貨膨脹長(zhǎng)時(shí)間是可能的，如果認(rèn)證機(jī)構(gòu)不斷增加其購(gòu)買債券，積極穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)的通貨膨脹是不可行的。當(dāng)借款人被金融摩擦的制約，還有債券價(jià)格流動(dòng)性溢價(jià)和LST可以有關(guān)于通貨膨脹和福利比SLF和奧妙的關(guān)系性質(zhì)不同的預(yù)測(cè)，因?yàn)楹髢烧邔?duì)借款人和貸款人的不同影響。 OMO進(jìn)一步不同于SLF，它不僅影響通脹和貸款市場(chǎng)，也改變了政府債券的私營(yíng)機(jī)構(gòu)可以進(jìn)行投保風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的數(shù)額。

　　何超，中國(guó)人民大學(xué)漢青研究院助理教授，美國(guó)威斯康星大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士，研究方向?yàn)楹暧^經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，search theory，貨幣政策等。論文曾發(fā)表于Review of Economic Dynamics。

　　原文：We examine the effects of three different monetary policy implementation schemes: lump sum taxes (LST), standing lending facility (SLF), and open market operations (OMO), in a unified monetary framework where agents actively borrow and lend and trade government bonds. We show that without financial frictions, anticipated inflation has the same marginal effect, no matter which of the three implementation scheme is used by the central bank (CB). However, with OMO alone, though extended periods of positive inflation is possible if the CB continually increases its bond purchases, positive steady state inflation is not feasible. When borrowers are constrained by financial frictions, there is a liquidity premium in bond prices and LST can have qualitatively different predictions regarding the relationship between inflation and welfare than SLF and OMO, because the latter two have differential effects on borrowers and lenders. OMO further differs from SLF in that it not only affects inflation and the loan market, but also changes the amount of government bonds that private agents can carry to insure against risks.